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ABSTRACT	
 
Author: Courtney May 
 
Title: The Hukou System– Marketization, Migration and Citizenship in Post-socialist China 
 
Supervising Professors: Dr. Xiaobo Lu (Department of Government), Dr. Paula Newberg 
(Department of Government) 
 
When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) achieved power in 1949, it became concerned 
with differentiating residential groups as a means to orchestrate state developmental priorities 
and to a lesser extent control population movement. In pursuit of its industrialization and 
developmental goals, the CCP created a rigid and impermeable barrier to rural-urban migration: 
the hukou or household registration system. Over the course of the last decade, China has been 
gradually relaxing the hukou restrictions, allowing for increased movement. In 2015, the China’s 
State Council announced that it would grant urban hukou’s to 100 million permanent urban 
residents by 2020, as part of its ‘orderly’ hukou reform. Additionally, hukou administration has 
become increasingly decentralized and the agricultural/nonagricultural distinction in cities is 
being eliminated in many cities. It remains vital to the Chinese Communist Party’s efforts to 
maintain control and remain in power in the single-party state. 
The hukou system has been so successful that it’s created a spatial hierarchy, a dual-
society, split between urban and rural hukou holders. Rural hukou holders are disadvantaged by 
unequal access to quality education and healthcare, as well as relegated to a separate class of 
citizenship by their disparate rights and duties. The goods and services provided by the 
government to urban hukou holders are superior and rural hukou holders are unable to move to 
cities to access them. My paper discusses the inequality of opportunity experienced by rural 
hukou holders and concludes that the reforms that have been underway since the early 2000’s do 
not go far enough to reduce inequality. Instead, the reforms are intended to promote urbanization 
as part of China’s effort to shift from an industrial to a service and consumer-based economy. To 
this end, some new urban hukou’s are being issued by cities but not enough to make a significant 
impact. My paper concludes with several recommendations for further reforms to the hukou 
system that would help ameliorate the inequality of opportunity. 
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The	Hukou	System:	Marketization,	Migration	and	Citizenship	in	
	Post-socialist	China	
	
	
I. Introduction	
	
Though perhaps less well known than China’s one-child policy, the hukou system is a 
hallmark of population control in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The hukou system 
(translates to English as household registration system) has wrought a pronounced divide 
between rural and urban residents in China in terms of benefits, opportunities, and social status. 
Citizens across the nation have different duties and lack the same right to pursue a strong 
education and high standard of living, because the hukou system makes moving to secure a job 
or quality education exceedingly difficult. Since the early 2000’s, hukou reforms have been 
gradually introduced, leaving some with a sense of hopeful optimism, others with a sentiment of 
too little, too late.  
After learning that reforms were taking place, I was curious as to how substantive they 
are and what their purpose is. The state’s motivation for implementing reforms appears to be 
twofold–promoting urbanization, as part of the country’s shift from an industrial economy to a 
service and consumer-based economy, and maintaining the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 
grip on political power in the single party state. But might reforms nonetheless have the added 
consequence of loosening constraints on movement and lessening the disadvantages of rural 
Chinese? After researching the hukou system I was left with a critical query–do hukou reforms 
significantly roll back the institutionalized inequality brought about by the hukou system? If not, 
what else could be done to address this inequality? In this paper, I seek to address these 
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questions, which are critical to understanding how sociopolitical conditions are evolving with 
China’s economy, by describing the problems brought about by the hukou system and evaluating 
reforms’ ability to solve them. 
 
 Though modifications may now be warranted, the hukou system is not arbitrary, cursory, 
or hastily implemented. When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) secured power in 1949, it 
became concerned with differentiating residential groups as a means to orchestrate state 
developmental priorities and manage population movement. The state needed a policy that would 
prevent overcrowding by keeping the number of non-working residents in major cities to a 
minimum, an impossible outcome if China’s prodigious population was allowed to move about 
unrestricted. There are few homeless individuals, even in Chinese megacities like Beijing and 
Shanghai, which may surprise visitors who have spent time in places like New York City. Blind 
migration would be shambolic in China. 
 In pursuit of orderly development, China’s government implemented the hukou system 
over the course of the 1950’s through a series of policy initiatives. China needed to organize its 
human capital if it was to join the ranks of the industrialized nations through a planned economy. 
The country needed a system by which it could track workers’ movements and entice or disallow 
them from moving, based on an area’s labor needs. It was also critical that rural agricultural 
production feed the burgeoning nation. The hukou system provided a basis for resource 
allocation, as well as social stability (Cheng 1994). Yet changes in China’s economic policy and 
the global market have brought an increasing demand for labor in cities, which has impelled 
Chinese leaders to modify the hukou system.  
	 8	
 Chinese leaders, who are all members of the Chinese Communist Party, also had a 
political motivation for establishing and preserving the hukou system. Though China is not a 
democracy and does not elect its leaders, CCP members must maintain a level of popularity and 
support amongst the Chinese people that precludes widespread protest and overthrow. The CCP 
has institutionalized certain political safeguards of its power. The hukou system is one such 
safeguard. However, migrants have begun bypassing the hukou system, mitigating its efficacy. 
Reforms are also likely designed by the CCP to neutralize the threat that the migrants pose to 
CCP power.  
The literature on hukou system is diffuse, so my paper combines analysis of Chinese 
policy in practice and statistics from a broad swath of sources–books, academic journals, and 
Chinese and western news sources. I rely heavily on pre-existing statistical analysis from other 
academic studies; including Dorothy Solinger’s conclusions about migrant workers in China, 
Kam Wing Chan’s analysis of recent hukou reforms, Davis and Feng’s study of inequality in 
post-socialist China, and Fei-Ling Wang’s theories regarding institutional exclusion and hukou 
reform.  
After considering key characteristics of the hukou system, I argue that the hukou system 
has produced inequality of opportunity (as opposed to an outcomes-based type of inequality such 
as inequality of income) in access to education and healthcare. Additionally, it has manifested 
two classes of citizens. My paper then discusses the reforms that have been underway in China 
since the early 2000’s and considers the impact that these reforms will have on access to 
education, access to healthcare, and citizenship in China. Is the inequality of opportunity brought 
about by the hukou system being mitigated or do reforms fall short? I chose to address education 
and healthcare in this paper because both services are critical to promoting equality of 
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opportunity, though I anticipate that further study would illuminate similar trends in housing and 
labor markets, as a result of the hukou system.  
Because the hukou system is at the heart of so many aspects of Chinese life, it is 
necessary to approach it by looking at its effects on certain areas. Attempting to chronicle every 
attribute and impact of the hukou system would be futile. Moreover, the hukou system is never 
finalized, rather it is constantly evolving in response to a multitude of socioeconomic and 
political factors, as well as being molded by state policies. The way the Chinese people interact 
with it is in constant flux. In fact, studying the hukou system can be similar to looking through a 
kaleidoscope. With each turn, the colors and patterns appear a little different. In order to produce 
as complete an image as possible in a single paper, my paper will make three turns of the 
kaleidoscope, considering the hukou system through its effects on the salient areas of education, 
healthcare, and citizenship. In the following three sections, I briefly introduce each area.  
 
i. Education	
	
The hukou system has profound implications for the equality of opportunity in China 
because access to education is dependent on one’s hukou. Though nearly all children are 
provided with at least a rudimentary education, the variation among schools is vast. Standards for 
rural schools often pale in comparison to their elite urban counterparts, putting rural children at 
an abysmal disadvantage to pursue higher education or gainful employment. Despite the 
dramatic rise in overall college admissions during the late 1990’s which has led to more Chinese 
students attending college than ever, elite Chinese universities determine their own admissions 
standards and seats often go to students from top high schools, which tend to be located in urban 
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settings. Education is also essential to China’s continued economic development, as education is 
critical for a labor force equipped with the skills to fill jobs, which in China are increasingly 
service jobs rather than assembly-line jobs. Moreover, education is one of the most vital social 
services a government can provide, offering one of the highest returns on investment of any good 
or benefit (Brauw and Scott 2007). Under the hukou system, families were unable to relocate to 
seek out better education resources (Lu 2013). In this paper, I consider whether hukou reforms 
will help equalize educational opportunities by allowing families more mobility to put their 
children in a position to be competitive for college admissions.  
 
 
ii. Healthcare	
	
China’s healthcare system is also closely tied to the hukou system, which has caused 
substantial inequalities to persist between rural and urban hukou holders’ access to healthcare. In 
the 1980’s, China decentralized control over much of the healthcare sector, so the quality of 
healthcare now depends on local taxation. Because local governments distribute the benefits they 
can, based on taxation percentages, residents of wealthy coastal cities enjoy far more benefits 
than rural dwellers, who may fund the majority of their healthcare expenses out of pocket 
(Houggaard, Osterdal, Yu 2011). This is also why some cities are hesitant to admit more hukou 
holders, as it would be forced to spread its health spending among more people. Might spreading 
health spending over more city residents bring urban health spending more in line with rural 
health spending?  
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iii. Citizenship	
	
Citizenship includes a set of duties, abilities, and accommodations not afforded to 
noncitizens, such as voting rights and social benefits. However, citizenship in China is vaguely 
defined by the Constitution and is far from uniform in practice. Article 33 of the Constitution of 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) states: 
 
All persons holding the nationality of the People’s Republic of China are citizens of the  
People’s Republic of China. All citizens of the People’s Republic of China are equal  
before the law. Every citizen is entitled to the rights and at the same time must perform  
the duties prescribed by the Constitution and the law (Constitution 2004). 
 
What are the rights that the people are entitled to? Do laws include all directives from the CCP 
leadership, which carry great weight? 
China’s policies have in essence created three distinct classes of citizens--rural, urban, 
and migrant. Rural citizens, urban citizens, and migrant citizens receive incommensurate 
benefits, though their duties and responsibilities to the state are roughly the same. Moreover, 
rural citizens lack the right to move to a city to pursue a better quality of life. If they move to the 
city, they are unable to access government-provided goods and services like education and 
healthcare in their new home.  
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II.	Background	and	Early	Development	
	
i. Hukou	System	in	Historical	Context	
	
 The end of the Chinese Communist Revolution gave way to the founding of the modern 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 and the beginning of the Maoist Era, which would 
last until Mao Zedong’s death in 1976. Under Chairman Mao’s leadership, China became guided 
by Marxist-Leninist ideology. Mao promoted a centrally planned economy, collectivization of 
agriculture, and rapid industrialization. Political destabilization resulted from the hardships the 
country endured during the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution. Nevertheless, the 
population boomed. Then came China’s Reform Era (1970’s-1990’s), during which China 
transitioned from a planned economy to a market economy (hereafter referred to as 
“marketization”) under the guidance of Deng Xiaoping, embracing capitalism. This period of 
rapid political, economic, and social change set the backdrop for the establishment and initial 
development of the hukou system in the PRC. The hukou system, a socialist relic, has interacted 
with China’s capitalist economy in strange ways, as China’s public goods regime declines and 
marketization marches forward in more sectors. This section aims to contextualize the hukou 
system’s early development and describe the system’s key features.  
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ii. Antecedents	
	
 Though the hukou system has only existed in its current form since the 1950’s, its origins 
can be traced to imperial China. A similar institution was implemented during the Warring States 
period (fifth century B.C.) and played a momentous role in the political order under dynasties 
from the Qin (third century B.C.) to the Qing (1644-1911). The effectiveness of this imperial 
antecedent fluctuated, at times serving as nothing more than a family register. Yet in the Qi state 
(seventh century B.C.), the hukou-like system was used to impose regionally diverse taxation and 
conscription policies. At other times, it was used to restrict population movement (Wang 2005).  
 Another influence for the hukou system comes from the Soviet Union. The Soviet 
propiska system was implemented in 1932, following the Russian Revolution. The propiska 
system required a residence permit and an internal passport for all citizens older than sixteen. 
Soviet citizens were restricted “to one legal place of residence, and its presentation was required 
to accept work, enter a school or institution of higher learning, get married, and perform other 
civic formalities (“The Residence…”). Though the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960’s damaged 
relations between Beijing and Moscow, The Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China 
were the two largest communist nations in the world in the 1950’s and many parallels exist 
between their socialist policies.  
 
iii. Development	
	
Though the Republic of China (ROC) and the People’s Republic of China both 
implemented a form of the hukou system, the system underwent major changes during the 1950’s 
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that brought it nearer to its modern permutation. The hukou system has never been legislatively 
established, though there is some push to change this in modern China. Rather, the hukou system 
has been shaped by a series of rules and directives, whose titles are wonderfully descriptive. In 
1955, the State Council issued a series of directives that would lay the groundwork for the hukou 
system: “Directive on the Establishment of a Permanent System of Household Registration,” 
“Temporary Methods for Supplying Urban Grain Rations,” and “Criteria for Demarcation of 
Urban and Rural Areas (Solinger 1999).” Then Mao Zedong called on the National People’s 
Congress to author and release the seminal “Regulations on Household Registration in the 
People’s Republic of China,” formally establishing the national hukou system and creating the 
rules that would guide it. This regulation was later bolstered by the 1985 “Regulation on 
Resident’s Personal Identification Card,” which created a requirement similar to the propiska’s 
identification card requirement. The PRC State Council, its Ministry of Public Security, and local 
security officials were to be the administrators, arbiters, and enforcers of the hukou system. 
Given that the PRC Constitution makes no mention of the hukou system, these directives form 
the legal basis of the system (Wang 2005).  
Further directives have shaped the way migrants interact with the hukou system. The 
1983 “Regulations Concerning Cooperative Endeavors of City and Town Laborers” allowed 
peasants to move into market towns and the 1985 “Provisional Regulations on the Management 
of Population Living Temporarily in the Cities” permitted peasants to take jobs in the cities, 
though no social services were extended to them. By the mid-1980’s, everyone was required to 
carry a citizen identification card that specified one’s hukou registration. The subsequent 1989 
and 1991 directives allowed state owned enterprises (SOE’s) to sign contractors directly with 
workers and report the hiring to the Labor Department later on, rather than requiring migrants to 
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go through the Labor Department to secure urban employment, as had been previously been the 
case. Low level workers began to be hired, regardless of their hukou registration, for city jobs 
that urbanites refused to work (Solinger 1999). Today, the number of migrants has risen to nearly 
270 million (Tiezzi 2016). 
 
iv. Key	Features		
	
At first, the hukou system allowed for some fluidity, as evidenced by Article 90 of the 
1954 constitution, which guaranteed Chinese citizens “freedom of residence and freedom to 
change their residence (Constitution 2004)”. However, widespread economic upheaval and 
famine invoked by China’s Great Leap Forward campaign (1958-1961) invited inordinate 
amounts of rural-urban migration. The state responded by increasing the scope and strictness of 
the hukou system, until it amounted to a nearly impermeable barrier to migration for Chinese 
around the nation. 
The hukou system requires each person to be registered with their family at their place of 
residence, which was almost certainly the place of their mother’s hukou location, until 1998 
when a child had the option to use the father’s hukou location. Each Chinese person can have 
only one official hukou at any given time. A person’s hukou cannot be exchanged or transferred 
without explicit permission from the Chinese government, and that permission has not often been 
granted. Historically, migration certificates were granted primarily for individuals hired by a 
state-owned enterprise, displaced from rural land as result of state expropriation, admitted to an 
institution of higher education, granted cadre promotion, experiencing exceptional family 
circumstances, or recruited to the armed forces (Chan and Buckingham 2008). As a result, most 
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people are forced to lead lives bound to their village or city, though the numerous migrants today 
demonstrate that many Chinese would like the ability to move. A person’s hukou serves as proof 
of their official status, either rural or urban, and is a prerequisite to nearly all daily needs and 
activities–housing, employment, education, marriage. This is because nearly all state-distributed 
goods and services flow through a person’s hukou. 
Since China began its transition from a planned to a market economy under the 
leadership of Deng Xiaoping, rural hukou holders have had the ability to sustain an urban 
livelihood without state support. Some individuals decided to forego access to state-provided 
goods and services in their hometown by moving to a city to find work, without first obtaining an 
urban hukou. These people are known as the floating or impermanent migrants (hereafter simply 
referred to as migrants). During the 1980s, a wave of hukou-less migrant workers appeared of 
their own accord in China’s major cities, often leaving their families behind in the countryside. 
Some migrant workers were recruited by state-owned enterprises (SOE’s) and were thus granted 
an urban hukou. Both sorts of migrants tend to be treated like foreigners in major cities, a 
pseudo-xenophobia that partitioned locals from outsiders, though hukou-less migrants were by 
far the worse off of the two. The temporary residence permit created in the 1980’s did little to 
address inequality, as migrant workers were still denied fundamental social services. For those 
granted a coveted urban hukou, permanent or temporary, they could be immediately stripped of 
their hukou for engaging in in any sort of criminal activity.  
 There have always been two categories of hukou in China. Initially, the types were based 
on occupation–agricultural and non-agricultural. As their names suggest, agricultural hukou’s 
were mostly held by rural farmers and non-agricultural hukou’s were primarily held by urbanites 
who had jobs other than farming. Agricultural hukou holders were forced to send surplus grain to 
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the government for distribution amongst non-agricultural hukou holders in the city. As farms 
were increasingly collectivized and fewer rural people engaged in farming, the two types of 
hukou became to be known as urban and rural. Urban hukou’s are preferable to rural hukou’s 
because they still give a person access to a higher quality of government-provided goods and 
services. The divide between China’s rural and urban areas has become seemingly impervious, a 
division that some have deemed the “bamboo curtain.” Recently, there has been a push to do 
away with these distinctions altogether in lieu of a unified hukou, though hukou’s would still be 
based on one’s location of residence. 
As China’s economy continues to grow at rates as high as seven or eight percent GDP, its 
city centers become ever more sprawling, engulfing the countryside areas at their margins to 
make room for more high rises and industrial complexes. Such urban sprawl has created a legion 
of agricultural hukou holders now living in urban areas, no longer able to farm. In relation to 
their neighbors, these rural hukou holders are disadvantaged by the inferior benefits granted by 
their hukou. Local governments have begun to recognize this mismatch and do away with 
agricultural/non-agricultural distinction in the areas under their jurisdiction. Many cities now 
have a jumin (unified) hukou, thereby extending equal rights, benefits, and status to all urban 
dwellers. Many cities now offer new jumin hukou’s as compensation for land expropriation. 
The Ministry of Public Service and its local subsidiaries enforce the hukou system. 
Detainment, repatriation, and fines can all be rendered for those found without the proper hukou. 
Typically, security officials are more concerned about rural hukou holders living illegally in the 
city, rather than urban hukou holders living in the countryside. Security officials tend to be very 
supportive of the hukou system, as it allows them to know who is under their jurisdiction. 
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Moreover, criminals can be stripped of their non-agricultural hukou, which dis-incentivizes 
crime. 
 
v. Political Logic  
The hukou system is an asset to the CCP because it helps mitigate the potential for 
political instability and uprising in urban areas. The divide that the hukou system renders 
between urban and rural residents is not without reason. Urbanites pose the biggest threat to CCP 
power because they tend to be the best educated and have the most resources at their disposal. A 
well-coordinated urban uprising could lead to the rise of a new political party and oust the CCP. 
In order to mollify urban residents, the CCP must ensure that they can be prosperous and 
successful. If cities were burdened with an influx of rural people with little education and no 
skills to contribute to the city, they become a burden on city public goods and services without 
contributing to the overall productivity of the cities. The CCP must guard against an influx of 
these sorts of individuals or else it risks angering urbanites who would be negatively impacted. 
Migrants to the cities must be hardworking and have skills that will contribute to the betterment 
of the city and the ultimate contentment of the urban hukou holders. 
Rural hukou holders seem less likely to stage a devastating uprising in part because 
coordination would be difficult. They are spread across large areas. So much planning would 
have to go into such a protest that the CCP would be likely to get wind of it and be able to stamp 
it out before it came to fruition. Nevertheless, the rural hukou holders’ staggering numbers makes 
a rural uprising an ongoing threat. Rural hukou holders have many reasons to rise up, given the 
inequality of opportunity that they face (as discussed in section II). Yet many seem unaware of 
the extent to which the state priorities urban hukou holders over them. It is in the state’s best 
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interest to keep the rural hukou holders out of the cities so that they remain unaware of what they 
are missing and complacent. If the CCP were to do away with the hukou system altogether, cities 
would be overrun. This would anger the existing urban residents, whose quality of life would 
diminish. It would also enrage the former rural residents, who would realize what they had been 
missing. Such anger could fuel protests that would eliminate the CCP, a risk that the party is not 
willing to take. 
 
III.	Hukou	Policy	in	Practice–Inequality	of	Opportunity	
	
Equipped with an understanding of the historical context and general development of the 
hukou system, let us now consider the sociopolitical conditions that it has incited. The hukou 
system’s true significance lies not in its institutional features, but in the impact it has had on the 
Chinese people. Understanding the effects of the hukou system at its height will help us to 
understand the value of the reforms underway and to evaluate their potential to render change. 
This section describes the effects of the hukou system on the educational opportunities, the 
healthcare system, and citizenship in China. Each section considers the area more generally, 
before identifying its relevance to migrants. Migrants have been particularly impacted by the 
hukou system and many have fought its hold by moving without a hukou. Considering the plight 
of migrants helps paint a clear picture of the effects of the hukou system. 
Labor and housing opportunities offer fruitful areas for further analysis but this study will 
limit its consideration to the aforementioned areas because their relationship to the hukou system 
is more readily observed without engaging in technical market analysis, which is beyond the 
scope of this paper. Understanding the impacts of the hukou system is critical to assess the 
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implications of reforms, which I do in section IV of this essay. In this section, I aim to convey 
that the hukou system has produced an inequality of opportunity in education and healthcare, as 
well as created several classes of citizenship.  
  
i. Educational	Opportunities	
	
 Learning is valued in Chinese culture, both ancient and modern. The teacher-student 
relationship has traditionally been a sacred one. Education is also essential to labor force gains, 
ensuring that a nation can make full use of its human capital. In China, education is considered a 
public service, meaning China hosts one of the most capacious public education systems in the 
world to serve its substantial population. As a result of legislation passed in 1986, nine years of 
education is compulsory for all citizens. China’s Ministry of Education estimates that 99.7% of 
the population has completed nine years of basic education, according to a June 2016 survey 
(“China Education” 2016). Any student who wishes to further his or her education subsequently 
completes three years of high school, takes the National Higher Education Entrance Exam and 
may be admitted to a university. In some ways, this exam is the modern descendent of the 
bureaucratic exams administered to aspiring government officials in ancient China. It reflects 
China’s continued commitment to meritocratic ideals. Yet even a system that is fair by design 
can merely reinforce existing inequalities if it fails to actively guard against them. The 
geographically based inequalities of the hukou system seem to have mitigated the equalizing 
effect that the Exam might otherwise offer. 
 Geographically-based disparities in education begin at the primary school level, despite 
China’s near-universal education. A strict hierarchy between rural and urban education systems 
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has emerged, in which urban schools nearly always outrank rural schools in terms of quality. 
This privileges city children over their rural counterparts (Cheng and Selden 1994). Government 
education spending in rural areas tends to be much lower and increased resources often lead to a 
superior quality of education in the city. As a result, urban students are the top performing group 
on the National Higher Education Entrance Exam.  
Rural students struggle to compete for university admissions, in part because they are 
often ill-prepared by countryside schools. Household wealth and local school quality have a 
major impact on whether a child can continue on to higher education, on how a child will 
perform within school, and what the student’s job prospects will be once they graduate. Though 
rural families can now send their children to some urban schools for a considerable fee, rural 
students must still return to the countryside for the National Higher Education Entrance Exam. 
Rural youth far outnumber urban youth and more rural residents are taking the Exam than ever 
before. Thus, even rural youth who attended urban high schools must compete against a larger 
applicant pool to secure quota-based university seats. Universities are increasingly able to 
determine their own quotas, meaning they can admit different numbers of students from each 
province or municipality. In most cases, quotas are still not proportional to the number of 
applications received from a certain area.  
Moreover, most of China’s leading universities are located in urban environments, a 
factor that would be irrelevant if Chinese could move freely. However, many Chinese 
universities admit off-campus students, once on-campus slots have been filled, providing urban 
students with an avenue to university admissions not available to rural students. Off-campus 
students must have a local, urban hukou in order to fill one of these commuter seats so that they 
can obtain housing nearby (F.L. Wang 2005). Though there was a dramatic overall increase in 
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China’s college admissions quotas between 1999 and 2005, continued gains risk depreciating the 
value of a college degree and undermining returns. Nonetheless, allowing more students to 
attend college could help open more seats for rural students. Quota hikes seem likely to continue, 
as the government hopes to continue improving the quality of China’s labor force promoting 
domestic consumption. 
Educational achievement remains closely correlated with economic and employment 
opportunities, leading to a greater earning potential over the course of a person’s life. The 
following table demonstrates that the income one can expect to earn grows tremendously with 
each additional year of school completed. Additionally, Table I shows that college education 
bolsters income potential more than technical school, technical school more than high school, 
high school more than junior high school, and junior high school more than primary school. 
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Table I: Estimates of rates of returns to education in urban China, 1988–2001  
 
Year 
Years of 
schooling 
College/above 
versus high 
school 
Technical 
school versus 
high school 
High school 
versus junior 
high 
Junior high 
versus 
primary 
school 
1988 4 12.2 3.1 11 13.9 
1989 4.6 14.4 5.8 11.6 17.3 
1990 4.7 16.6 9.9 11.5 12.8 
1991 4.3 15.9 8 9.7 13.4 
1992 4.7 20.1 9.2 9.8 10.8 
1993 5.2 20.4 7 11.5 13.6 
1994 7.3 28.7 15.3 14.5 20.2 
1995 6.7 24.4 12 15.3 18.9 
1996 6.8 25.2 10.4 15.6 14.9 
1997 6.7 22.3 12 17.3 10.9 
1998 8.1 32.1 16.5 16.2 12.2 
1999 9.9 38.1 17 21 14.8 
2000 10.1 38.7 16.2 20.5 16.4 
2001 10.2 37.3 17.8 21.4 13.8 
 
Song,	Xiaoqing;	Albert	Park,	Yaohui	Zhao,	Junsen	Zhang.	Table	3.	Economic	returns	to	schooling		
in	urban	China,	1998	to	2001.	Journal	of	Comparative	Economics	33	(2005)	739. 
 
 In most countries, citizens would vote with their feet by moving to a location that allows 
them to access the education resources that will boost their lifetime earning potential. However, 
the hukou system has made such migration extraordinarily difficult for rural hukou-holders in 
China. The resulting inequalities in opportunity risks a phenomenon called the attribution theory, 
which says that people are more likely to think that economic success comes from corruption or 
criminal activity than talent or effort if the playing field is unequal. This could lead to 
widespread unrest in China because citizens’ attitudes toward inequality can have ramifications 
for political stability, a major concern for the Chinese Communist Party (Lu 2012). At the same 
time though, strong correlations between education and economic success indicate that many of 
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China’s power wielding elites have benefited from the current permutation of the education 
system. This makes it unlikely that the elites will petition for changes, and the uneducated may 
not have the means or ability to do so. 
 
 
ii. Education	and	Migrants1	
	
Many migrants are young and single. They are typically more literate than the average 
person in the town from which they came, but less literate than an urban hukou holder. Migrants’ 
lower education level often leads them to assume service or manufacturing jobs that require few 
skills. Migrant women often clean houses or work in a factory; migrant men work in a variety of 
industries. Moreover, the one-child policy created more opportunities for migrant workers to take 
these sorts of positions, as cities lacked enough workers to fill critical but undesirable jobs such 
as garbage collection (Davis and Feng 2009). Davis and Feng suggest that uneducated migrant 
workers may actually be preferred for certain manual jobs over uneducated urban workers, 
especially amongst. SOE’s and private corporations. This is because peasant migrants are more 
willing to work long hours for small wages, in poor conditions than urban youth are. They are 
also replaceable, given the immense number of migrants. Foreign firm can get away with treating 
migrants poorly because they tend to enjoy only light regulation from the central government. 
																																																						
1	This section owes much to Dorothy Solinger’s Contesting Citizenship in Urban China: Peasant 
Migrants, the State and the Logic of the Market. Her consideration of education and 
corresponding trends in employment and the labor market epitomize the deep effects of the 
hukou system.	
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The central government strongly desires foreign investment and is therefore willing to turn a 
blind eye to poor working conditions, as well as overlooking workers that have not obtained an 
urban hukou. In contrast, local governments tend to treat migrants more hesitantly because they 
are left to deal with the migrants, should they become unemployed. Local public security 
officials also worry about corresponding spikes in crime. Studies conflict in regard to how much 
crime is actually committed by migrants, but reports are likely skewed because migrants tended 
to be scapegoated for crimes they did not commit (Solinger 194-241).  
Under the hukou system, prior to its recent reforms, migrants legally had to leave their 
children behind in the countryside so that they could complete the nine years of compulsory 
education. Some migrants simply evaded this law–Solinger tells us that only 40% of 5-12 year-
old migrants in Beijing in 1995 attended school. Students could only enroll in schools at the site 
of their hukou and most migrants were unable to obtain an urban hukou in the city where they 
were working. It was often necessary for migrant children to be left behind to be raised by a 
grandparent or other family member. This had profound effects on migrant family dynamics, in a 
culture where multiple generations tend to live together and familial piety is sacred. 
In some cities, enterprising leaders sought to commodify migrants by allowing a black 
market to emerge, through which migrants could obtain an urban hukou for between 8000 and 
15,000 yuan, which would allow parents to purchase an urban hukou so their child could enroll 
in an urban school (Solinger 90).  
In the 1980’s and 1990’s, capitalism began occurring in the education sector and 
attending a public school with a local hukou was no longer the only option for education. 
Migrants and enterprising educators began establishing private schools for migrant children and 
some public schools began allowing enrollment from students without a local hukou for a 
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copious fee. Though it remained prohibitively expensive for many migrants to enroll their 
children in urban schools, prosperous migrants now had the option of bringing their children 
along with them to the city.  
 Migrants often learn new skills during their time in the city - whether through trade 
school or through job training - but scholars disagree as to how this impacts migrants’ home 
villages. Proponents of the modernization theory say migrants’ home villages benefit from new 
information and skills that migrants bring with them when they return home. Returned, 
cosmopolitan migrants may inspire youth in their home villages to pursue their education with 
vigor. Migrants may also benefit their communities by using trade skills that they learned in the 
city to establish businesses that provide useful services, businesses that may subsequently train 
and employ village youth. However, dependency theorists claim that skills migrants learn in the 
city are irrelevant to life in the countryside and the primary way that migrants effect their home 
villages is through remittances. Jeffrey Taylor warns that brain drain negatively impacts 
agriculture, and that villages become unproductive and dependent on remittances (Taylor, 1988). 
	
iii. Access	to	Healthcare	
	
Amartya Sen questions whether social consequences in China are the result of economic 
reforms, or whether economic consequences have stemmed from social reforms (Sen 1999). Sen 
identifies healthcare reform as one of those social phenomena that seems inextricably linked to 
economic development. R.W. Fogel makes a similar claim, arguing that between 1790 and 1980 
one third of Britain’s income gains result from improved health (Fogel 1994; Yan, Zhang, Wang, 
Rozelle 2006). Strong healthcare is certainly critical to the rise of developing countries. The 
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advances that China has made in its post-1949 years in healthcare have led to the substantially 
increased longevity and vigor of its labor force, which is especially momentous because China’s 
workforce is one of its most valuable resources. Yet I would argue that the relationship between 
economic growth and health is cyclical because economic growth also provides more money that 
can be invested back into healthcare improvement. As China’s economy continues to grow, the 
government has an opportunity to further augment the capacity of its workforce by reinvesting 
economic gains in its healthcare system. 
 In 1949, China established the Cooperative Medical System (CMS), which helped 
facilitate the delivery of healthcare to rural persons. It allowed poor rural workers to pool their 
money as part of a collective in order to afford insurance and healthcare. Largely as a result of 
this system, the health of China’s population improved significantly between 1952 and 1958. 
CMS was eliminated in the 1980’s, when the introduction of a market economy disbanded 
collectives and revolutionized China’s agricultural sector. Rural healthcare had to be rethought. 
Soon after, the New Rural Cooperative Medical System (NCRMS) was implemented in 2003 to 
help the struggling rural hukou holders to afford healthcare. NCRMS is distinctive from CMS in 
that it is a voluntary, opt-in program and participants have the option to pursue private healthcare 
if they so choose. As a result of these initiatives, infant mortality dropped from 200 to 34 babies 
per 1000 and overall life expectancy skyrocketed from 35 years to 68 years (McMullins-Owens 
2015). Similar to Western countries, China’s difficulty fighting infectious diseases gave way to 
struggle with chronic diseases.  
Central government spending in China declined from 32% to 15% between 1978 and 
1999, as the onus for healthcare shifted increasingly to local governments (Blumenthal and Hsiao 
2005). Seemingly overnight, the quality of healthcare in a given area became dependent on the 
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amount of money a city or region was able to raise through taxes. Urban areas had wealthier 
residents that cities were able to charge higher taxes in order to offer better services. Economic 
restructuring during the 1980’s also jolted health care facilities, which were forced to raise prices 
on their services after losing much of their government support. When government price controls 
on basic care were implemented, providers turned their focus to expensive pharmaceuticals and 
high tech services that catered to wealthy patients (Blumenthal and Hsiao 2005). Health care 
facilities in cities tend to have more patients who can afford these sorts of services, which 
increases the overall profitability of the health care provider. This allows urban health care 
providers to offer a superior quality of service, as well as more specialty services. Rural health 
care facilities rarely had the physicians or equipment to offer nonstandard medical procedures. 
Administration of China’s state-run health care system is dependent on China’s hukou 
system. State-provided health insurance and care flow through local institutions, near the site of a 
Chinese citizens’ hukou registration. This means that a rural person seeking care can expect to 
receive the lowest cost of care at the health care provider nearest to their hukou registration. 
Rural hukou holders are disadvantaged by lower quality of care from rural health care providers 
and their inability in most cases to seek care from an urban provider. Many rural hukou holders 
also struggle from lack of coverage.	By 1999, 49% of urban hukou holders had health insurance, 
while only 7% of rural hukou holders had health insurance (Blumenthal and Hsiao 2005).  
China has made efforts to close the gap in urban and rural healthcare with recent reforms. 
In 2009, the central government launched an initiative that included an $125 billion USD 
investment over three years, as part of its larger objective of achieving universal healthcare 
coverage by 2020. Given how many more rural hukou holders than urban hukou holders lack 
coverage, the government has focused its efforts on China’s rural western region by increasing 
	 29	
funding for primary care in public hospitals in that area. The government hopes to achieve 
universal coverage with basic benefits to all Chinese people, before deepening coverage to make 
it more comprehensive and useful (Yip et al 2012). 	
	
iv. Healthcare	and	Migrants	
	
 Except in rare instances, hukou-less migrants have been forced to return home to the site 
of their hukou in the countryside when they need medical care (Solinger 1999). Some do not 
survive the journey. This is because their public health insurance is locality-based. They might 
receive 80% coverage for routine care in the city, 60% coverage at a county hospital for more 
serious treatment, 25% coverage for a specialist in a city hospital, and 0% coverage for routine 
care in a city hospital. Urban medical providers may be willing to treat migrants but the migrant 
will almost certainly be forced to pay out-of-pocket. Private options for healthcare providers 
have begun to be established but these institutions are often expensive and of a questionable 
quality. Migrant workers tend to be young and vivacious, but they are not immune to disease or 
injury. In fact, occupational health and safety is a major concern amongst migrant workers, who 
are often subjected to poor working conditions.  
According to Hu, Cook, and Salazar, migrant health has garnered government attention in 
three areas – infectious disease, maternal health, occupational disease and injury – though it has 
been reticent to intervene (Cook, Hu Salazar 2008). One of the few forays made into migrant 
health by the public health department has been efforts to minimize infectious disease in migrant 
communities by providing vaccinations and other precautionary services (Solinger 1999). As an 
itinerant group, migrants have the potential to quickly spread diseases across the country. They 
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have a disproportionally high occurrence of sexually transmitted diseases and communicable 
diseases like severe acute respiratory syndrome. Maternal mortality is also higher amongst 
hukou-less migrant mothers, who have generally been forced to deliver in illegal private clinics 
rather than public hospitals because of their inability to travel home or afford urban health 
services. 
 It should also be noted that need of health care can be a major push factor for rural hukou 
holders considering migration. Health expenses are a leading cause of poverty in rural areas, 
which can prompt workers to seek higher wages from employment in a city. Rural hukou holders 
who suffer from a rare health condition may by drawn to the city by both higher wages and 
access to health specialists. 
	
v. Citizenship	and	Social	Stratification	
	
Citizenship involves a set of rights and duties that lay the foundation for a citizen’s 
relationship to the state. When an entire group of citizens have different rights and duties from 
another group of citizens, these groups constitute different classes of citizens. Both groups are 
still members of the same society but they can no longer be classified in the same way because of 
their different rights and duties. A right does not exist if a person does not have the ability to 
exercise it. Chinese rural and urban hukou holders in essence have different rights and duties 
entirely because they assert them in such drastically different environments. In China, different 
classes of citizenship have emerged and come to delineate the society’s social stratification as 
well. 
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 T.H. Marshall identifies three components of citizenship– civil, political and social. The 
civil component involves rights, such as the right to justice. This right is unique in that it 
involves the right to “defend and assert all one’s rights on terms of equality with others” 
(Marshall 1951). In China, the right to justice is not promoted by the hukou system. Rural 
citizens in theory have the same right to access quality education and healthcare that urban 
citizens do. But they are unable to defend or assert this right by moving from the countryside to 
the city in order to access the goods and services “on terms of equality with others” (Marshall 
1951). This denial is institutionalized by the hukou system, leaving rural hukou holders no path 
to redress. 
 Bryan Turner asserts that resource allocation is one of the two biggest issues in modern 
citizenship (1993). I would argue that if a state provides goods and services, as has been the case 
in China, then it should provide an equal quality of those goods and services to all citizens living 
in the same area. Yet individuals living in roughly the same area of China may receive disparate 
resources, simply because of the label of their hukou. Though the public goods regime has 
declined in China in recent years, many goods and services continue to be administered by local 
officials at the site of one’s hukou in the post-socialist state. One of the most significant 
components of citizenship in China–resource allocation–disproportionately benefits urban hukou 
holders. Rural hukou holders’ right to justice, as defined by T.H. Marshall is thus violated. As 
stated before, citizenship at its core is a set of rights and duties. In China, rural hukou holders 
have not only had added duties because they have been expected to contribute more to the state, 
especially in terms of grain, but have received less in return. 
Because of unequal rights and duties, the hukou system has in essence created three 
classes of citizens: urban, rural and migrant. Urban hukou holders have been privileged over the 
	 32	
rural hukou holders by nearly every measure (Cheng and Selden 1994). The rural-urban divide 
has been impermeable because of the hukou system’s constraint on movement– its use of welfare 
perquisites distributed at the location of one’s hukou registration to dis-incentivize movement.  
Deng Xiaoping envisioned cities getting rich and bringing the countryside up with them. 
All boats would rise in China, just not at the same time. Today, China remains in the first phase 
of his vision, which adds to the unfairness of the hukou restraints. 
Nor has marketization served to close the gap between the goods and services available to 
urban and rural citizens. We might think that opportunities in private industry and private goods 
and services might offset the inequality of opportunity created by rural citizens’ inability to 
access superior public goods and services in the city. This is not the case. A strange ecosystem 
has emerged in China, one of communist capitalism, of socialist institutional practices and 
market rules production and industrialization. Davis and Feng describe this phenomenon as 
follows: 
 
“Communist capitalism has not only produced an economic miracle but also glaring  
inequality. In 2005, China Daily reported that 236,000 citizens were millionaires and that  
the number of individuals with at least one million U.S. dollars in assets grew at the sixth  
fastest pace in the World (Wilson 2005). At the same time, per capita incomes are low  
and a majority of citizens live on less than two dollars a day” (Davis and Feng 2009). 
 
Davis and Feng go on to describe how markets and social benefits can either complement one 
another by benefitting the same individuals, or else market gains and redistributive social 
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benefits can offset one another. In China, it seems that urbanites are the beneficiaries of both 
market gains and public goods. 
 Wang points to the parallels between the stratification created by the hukou system and 
the Westphalian international system, which characterizes individuals geographically by nation 
of citizenship (Wang 2005). With increasing globalization and uneven economic development 
amongst nations, national citizenship has become salient as a social status. In much the same 
way, one’s social status in China, has become based on the geographical location of one’s hukou 
registration.  
All societies have members stratified socially by some fault line–whether by gender, 
ethnicity, education, or wealth–because humans inevitably have unequal capacities and 
resources. Most western societies have a vertical brand of stratification based on socioeconomic 
factors. China is unique in that it has a pronounced horizontal, geographically based stratification 
in which urbanites are better off than those living in the countryside, and those living along the 
east coast tend to be better off than those living in the nation’s western interior.  
Wang identifies four distinct methods of hierarchical organization common amongst 
societies around the world: Type I, who you are (i.e. caste); Type II, what you have (i.e. property 
or capital); Type III, where you are (i.e. hukou system); Type IV what you do. China, he says, is 
currently classified under Type III, while most capitalist countries have a Type II hierarchical 
social organization. Therefore, those who have benefitted most from China’s economic rise and 
public programs are not necessarily the most apt or deserving, but are just those individuals who 
were in the right place (the Western cities) at the right time (after the 1980’s). If the hukou 
system is loosened or abolished, China may see a social reshuffling and move toward a Type II 
hierarchy. 
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Social stratification and grouping can be helpful to the state in its efforts to govern 
effectively because cohesive subunits of the population are more easily managed. Wang argues 
that such division provides a basis for resource allocation and social stability, which has been the 
case in China. Both benefits in turn promote economic development, the paramount goal for 
China. Scholars like Wang assert that China’s development has outpaced Brazil and India 
precisely because those nations lacked an institutionalized like the hukou system.  
Though some parallels exist between India’s caste system (now de facto rather than de 
jure), the hukou system makes it much easier for China’s government to control and mobilize its 
labor force. All three nations have dual rural/urban economies and have sought to urbanize 
quickly, while keeping surplus labor in cities to a minimum. However, they differ in the 
uniformity and perceived legitimacy of their institutionalized social stratification. China’s hukou 
system and authoritarian regime seem to be the most successful. The following table, from 
Wang’s Organizing Through Division and Exclusion: China’s Hukou System is helpful to 
observe these differences and to compare features of China, Brazil and India. The chart identifies 
the type (I-IV, as discussed above) of hierarchical organization, the enforcers of the hierarchy, 
the efficacy of the enforcers, and several other measures of the country’s political and economic 
health. By these measures, it appears that the hukou system has been an asset for China, 
politically and economically, despite the disparities it brings about between urban, rural and 
migrant citizens. 
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Table II: In Addition to Money: Institutional Exclusion in Brazil, China, and India 
 
Country Brazil China India 
Institutional Exclusion Yes Yes Yes 
Common type (nationally) II II II 
Fault line What you have What you have What you have 
Legitimacy high high high 
Main enforcer market market market 
Uniformity high high high 
Effectiveness high high high 
Rigidity high medium high 
Unique type (nationally) little III (hukou) I (caste) 
Fault Line – Where you are  
  Who you are  
Legitimacy – high low 
Main Enforcer – the state society 
Uniformity – high low 
Effectiveness – high medium 
Internal Migration Control relaxed tight medium 
Performance/Implication    
Growth Rate (1990-2001) erratic high low 
Technological Sophistication medium medium low 
Urbanization completed slow/low slow/low 
Distribution of gains polarized uneven uneven 
Income inequality high medium medium 
Urban Poverty/slum presence high low high 
Population growth high low high 
Formal democracy yes no yes 
HDI Rank stagnation rise slow rise 
Subjective happiness index 77/100 78/100 72/100 
International standing medium high/rising medium 
 
Wang, Fei-Ling. Table 6.2, Organizing Through Division and Exclusion: China's Hukou  
System. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2005. Page 175, Print. 
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vi. Migrant	Citizens	and	Inequality2	
	
 Solinger focuses on the third class of citizen in China–the migrants. She insists that 
citizenship involves civil, political and social rights and that rural hukou holders who migrate to 
cities suffer in regard to all three categories of rights. Though scholars like TH Marshall, 
Barrington Moore, and SM Lipset agree that marketization typically promotes citizenship and 
civil participation, Solinger suggests that the hukou system, a socialist relic, has offset the civil 
benefits of capitalism that would otherwise exist (Marshall 1963, Moore1966, Lipset 1963). 
Hukou-holding urbanites are ascriptively privileged and unduly benefit from the urban public 
goods regime. There is only one upside I can see–Andrew Walder and Janos Kornai argue that 
welfare is a form of state control, meaning that migrants who forego public goods may actually 
enjoy more freedom (Walder 1986, Kornai 1992). 
In addition to allocation of resources, social membership is an essential component of 
modern citizenship, claims Bryan Turner. Migrants are denied social membership in their urban 
homes. Migrants in China are the equivalents of homeless persons or released convicts in the 
United States, in terms of their status in Chinese society. Solinger goes so far as to compare 
migrants to colonists, as migrants are reduced to subjects, without rights, whom the state 
manipulates for its imperial developmental goals. Migrants tend to create their own 
communities because they feel unable to participate in their larger urban communities (Solinger 
																																																						
2	This section owes much to Dorothy Solinger’s Contesting Citizenship in Urban China: Peasant 
Migrants, the State and the Logic of the Market. Her consideration of migrant citizenship 
epitomizes the hukou system’s effects on civil and social inclusion and inequality.	
	 37	
1930). They form their own networks within the cities in which they work but remain on the 
fringes of urban society. They also lack the opportunity to influence local elections, a level of 
Chinese politics where democracy is increasingly taking hold. Rural citizens are similarly 
powerless subjects, taken advantage of by the state, according to Solinger. Only urbanites are 
true rights-bearing citizens, she claims. The status of modern Chinese is defined by their 
relationship to the old institutions of government, not their race or income like in other 
countries. The good news for the state is that migrants are primarily concerned with economic 
rights, so the threat of social agitation remains low so long as they continue to find employment 
in the cities. 
The hukou-less migrant class of citizens is unique in that it its members have 
sidestepped the constraints of the hukou system, choosing to forego state goods and services in 
lieu of urban employment. After China transitioned from a planned to a market economy under 
the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, rural hukou holders were able to sustain an urban livelihood 
on their own by purchasing the goods and services they needed through private markets with 
their wages. Prior to the introduction of capitalism, such private markets did not exist legally 
and the only option had been for migrants to rely on their home village and rural hukou for 
goods and services, merely scraping by during their time in the city. They would bring along 
enough grain to support themselves while they worked, leave children behind with other family 
members, and return to the village when they needed medical services. The migrant class of 
citizenship must be considered distinct from the rural class, though most migrants have rural 
hukou’s, because most migrants lead their lives in the cities. They are not quite rural, nor quite 
urban and face unique challenges.  
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The families of many migrants have been broken apart, as children were left in the 
countryside to be raised by someone other than their parents, such as a grandparent. Other 
migrants never marry because their urban work schedule leaves no time for personal matters. 
Their lack of an urban hukou forces them into the shadows. Migrants are often subject to long 
hours and poor working conditions because they have no voice and no bargaining power over 
employers. This leaves them little time or energy to engage in community activities. 
 Civil inclusion is nearly nonexistent for migrant workers, who are shunned by a pseudo-
xenophobia that urbanites feel towards “country cousin” migrants. In other societies, only 
foreigners are subjected to such an extreme branding of otherness. Yet migrants no longer 
belong in the countryside once they migrate, making them akin to stateless persons. Migrants 
who return to their rural villages often find that the skills they gained in the city have no 
application in the countryside.  
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IV.	Hukou	Reforms	Since	the	Early	2000’s	
 
China has been relaxing the hukou system through a series of national reforms, most of 
which have taken place in the early 2000’s (“Special Topic Paper”). China has preferred to take a 
gradualist approach to hukou system reforms, as demonstrated by the fact that it began reforms in 
2000 and they are still under way (Davis and Feng 2009). Central government discussions of 
hukou reform almost always include the caveat that reforms will be gradual, not shock therapy. 
Chinese leaders do seem to be committed to sweeping reforms, eventually. The question is 
whether these reforms will be merely aesthetic or whether they manifest substantive change. 
Judging by the trajectory of reforms thus far, we must ask ourselves–do reforms merely amount 
to “loud thunder, little raindrops,” as the Chinese idiom warns? Table III displays a few of the 
major national reforms that have been made. This table is not a comprehensive list of reforms but 
identifies a few important reforms that will be discussed in this section of my paper. Please see 
the appendix for a more exhaustive list of reforms at the provincial and city level. 
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Table III: National Reforms Since the Early 2000’s 
Year Issuing Entity Reform 
1997 State Council Allowed migrants in certain small towns and cities to obtain an 
urban hukou if they had a job and had established residence for 
two years 
2001 State Council Allows migrants to obtain urban hukou in provinces and large 
cities if they can satisfy certain criteria, which are typically 
more stringent than those in small towns 
2003 State Council Eliminated the repatriation system, under which migrants were 
often abused 
2015 State Council Extend urban hukou’s to 100 million migrants by 2020  
 
In some ways, loosening state control over internal migration is a natural next step to 
follow China’s marketization because it allows the supply and demand of capitalism, rather than 
the government, to guide the labor force. Given that China is attempting to shift from an 
industrial and export-based economy to a service and consumer-based economy, it is necessary 
to consider what role the hukou system will play in the shift and what changes to the system 
might be needed. Though hukou reforms may not yet constitute an overhaul of the hukou 
system–an end that Chinese news media have long prophesied-–change has certainly gained pace 
over the course of the past few years.  
 
In remarks to the U.S. Congressional Executive Commission on China, Fei-Ling Wang 
notes that the “hukou system has been an administrative system with sketchy legal foundations. 
It has been governed and regulated by mostly ‘internal’ decrees and directives” (Wang 2005). 
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These directives were also described in Part I of this paper. Similarly, hukou reforms have been 
wrought by central government directives. However, some reforms have merely been announced 
and not formally codified yet. Thus, my research in this section relies more heavily on news 
media coverage of statements by state and local Chinese leaders. 
 
Until recently there had always existed two categories of hukou registration. The urban 
and rural hukou categories had replaced the earlier agricultural and non-agricultural labels 
respectively, as farms were collectivized and many rural workers had an occupation other than 
agriculture. Then, in 1992, a State Council Working Group called for unification of the rural and 
urban hukou’s. China’s State Council adopted the Working Group’s recommendation in 2014 
and announced a unified hukou system for rural and urban residents (Chan and Buckingham 
2008). As of early 2016, 29 regions have announced their plans to comply with the State 
Council’s directive by phasing out the two hukou categories in lieu of a general hukou (jumin). 
Though a notable break with history, the introduction of jumin may be more cosmetic than 
substantive. Social services and resource distribution will remain location-based, they just will 
no longer be differentiated by the broad urban and rural categories. 
In my estimation, the primary and most impactful reform that has taken place has been 
the decentralization of control of the hukou system, which allows cities to grant new urban 
hukou’s and determine who will receive them. Shanghai, Beijing and other metropolises have 
instituted point-based plans for admittance, weighing factors such as employment, residence, 
insurance and how long a migrant may have already lived in the city. Small cities and towns 
have introduced more relaxed policies for granting new hukou’s. Some cities require that hukou 
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applicants pay a fee, such as a social security payment. The State Council recommends that 
applicants not be burdened with such payments for more than five years (Wu 2016).  
Marketization has been an impetus for the relaxation of the hukou system because the 
state no longer controls the sole provider for many social services and resources. Government 
subsidies and welfare services have been steadily declining, especially in the distribution of food. 
With the decline of the welfare state, admitting more migrants is not so burdensome to cities as it 
once was. The degree to which the hukou system has been liberalized varies widely by region 
and by city but mobility has generally improved. Small cities and towns are authorized to grant 
an urban hukou to anyone who has maintained a steady income and established residence for at 
least two years. In 2006, China’s central government did away with the hukou requirement for 
civil servants altogether. Nevertheless, it remains exceedingly difficult for potential migrants to 
secure an urban hukou in one of China’s mega cities. 
Since the 1980’s, a series of measures have served to further devolve fiscal and 
administrative responsibilities for the hukou system to lower levels of government. The central 
government exercised complete control over the system prior to the 1980’s, granting or denying 
(nong zhuan fei) permission to move as it saw fit. Fei Ling Wang notes that “since 1997 and 
especially since 2001, there has been so-called ‘deep reforms’ of the hukou system, primarily 
concerning its migration-control function” (Wang 2005). The localization of the hukou system 
has allowed cities to admit the workers that they need to meet output goals. However, it has not 
made migration to a large city significantly easier for the common rural migrant. Cities tend to 
grant new hukou’s to highly educated and skilled workers, the wealthy, and the politically well-
connected. In a sense though, this has made urban hukou administration more meritocratic. As 
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long as they are not tainted by corruption, points-based plans ensure that urban hukou’s go to 
deserving individuals.  
 Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen have some of the highest thresholds for 
entry, in part because they continue to offer some of the highest social benefits (Chan and 
Buckingham 2008). Shijiazhuang was amongst the first provincial level cities to eliminate 
requirements for individuals seeking an urban hukou there altogether, and granted 450,000 new 
hukou between the years 2001 and 2003. The city serves as a cautionary tale because 
Shijiazhuang had to revise its policy when its underdeveloped social service system was overrun 
by an influx of migrants (Yang 2011). In contrast, Beijing has replaced its former quota system 
with a points-based permit system that grants an urban hukou to migrants who meet four basic 
requirements before applying for residence: obtain a residence permit in the city, pay social 
insurance in the city for seven consecutive years, no criminal record, and younger than the 
retirement age. The Beijing points plan is rather vague though, in that it does not specify how 
many points a migrant will need (Su and Rongde 2016). Applicants receive extra points for being 
younger than 45 years old and holding advanced degrees. The new system goes into effect 
January of 2017. However, Li Xiaozhuang from the Beijing Academy of Social Sciences 
predicts that admittance to Beijing will become more competitive than ever because only 10,000 
new urban hukou’s will be granted each year (Salvacion 2016). Local officials’ decision making 
is informed by interest in their city’s success rather than the good of the country as a whole. 
Local leaders hope that they can use new urban hukou’s to bring in a strong labor force that will 
draw foreign investment, as well as bring in wealthy migrants who will contribute to the city’s 
tax base. 
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Another significant switch in the hukou system is the 2003 replacement by the State 
Council of the 1982 “Measures of Detaining and Repatriating Floating and Begging People in 
the Cities” with the “Measures on Repatriation of Urban Homeless Beggars” and “Measures on 
Managing and Assisting Urban Homeless Beggars without Income.” The reversal came in 
response to the highly publicized case of the young migrant to Guangzhou who beaten to death 
during the repatriation process. The new policies have led to more humane treatment of migrants 
who are discovered to be living in a city without an urban hukou (Wang 2005).  
As of the time this paper was written, the most recent reform measure was an 
announcement by China’s State Council the year before that it would “grant urban residence 
permits to 100 million permanent residents by 2020 – a huge number but still less than half of the 
nearly 274 million migrant workers China had by 2014” (Tiezzi 2016). This was the latest 
component of what Chinese Premier Li Keqiang calls an orderly path to increase urban residency 
for the country, a fundamental element of China’s attempted economic shift.  
 
V.	Purpose	and	Outcomes	of	Reforms	
	
i. State	Motivation	behind	Reforms	
	
	 Identifying the state’s motivation for reforms can provide insight into the intended 
purpose of the reforms. It seems that the impetus behind changing the discriminatory system has 
been the state’s desire to maintain socioeconomic order and promote developmental goals, as 
well as to maintain CCP power. Leaders Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao have indicated that they 
consider the hukou system a liability for political stability (Wang 2005).  
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The rural hukou holders so outnumber the urban hukou holders that an uprising in protest 
of the inequality brought about the hukou system could be disastrous for the CCP, though it 
seems unlikely as long as economic conditions continue to improve across the country. To 
guarantee that such a protest will not occur though, the state needs to be proactive in addressing 
the threat posed by the rural hukou holders who have migrated to cities. In order to regain control 
of these migrants, the state needs to extend urban hukou’s to those migrants who are benefitting 
the cities and get rid of those migrants who are merely weighing down the cities’ robust public 
goods and services. Such actions are likely to engender bad feelings towards the state though, 
which means the state should pass off culpability to another entity if it can do so without 
diminishing its own ultimate control. So far, the state has passed off the reigns to local 
governments, which conveniently allows the cities to take the immediate blame for complaints 
about the hukou system. Yet local governments still ultimately answer to the central government, 
meaning the CCP is still pulling the strings behind the scenes.  
In modern China, economic growth has tended to rank first among state priorities. The 
hukou system has allowed China to harness the potential of one of its greatest resources–its labor 
force. China’s ability to move the appropriate workers to the industrial areas in need of their 
services allowed China to remain the world’s factory for decades and benefit economically from 
exports (Chan and Buckingham 2008). Yet the marketization and privatization of previously 
government monopolized industries has given migrants a venue through which they can access 
necessary goods and services without an urban hukou, threatening state and local control over 
movement. If people no longer live at the site of their hukou registration, it becomes much more 
difficult for the government to keep track of them. 
	 46	
Compared to other developed and developing nations, China has had a rather slow 
urbanization, only amounting to 30% in 2000. This is viewed as a negative consequence of the 
hukou system: 
 
Slow urbanization perpetuates a stable dual economy featuring a rural majority of the 
population and a stable, large, ever-increasing rural-urban disparity of income and 
resource distribution. Officially, the urban and rural incomes were disparate by a factor of 
about 2.2 in 1964, 2.6 in 1978, 2.7 in 1995, and 2.8 in 2000. Semiofficially, the urban-
rural income gap was estimated to stand at a factor of about 4.0 in 1993.25 Including 
indirect income in the form of state subsidies, the gap stood at a staggering 5.0–6.0 by 
2001 (Wang 2005). 
 
As China’s economic growth continues to stagnate, China’s leaders claim the slowdown 
is merely growing pains from the country’s shift from an industrial to a service and consumer-
based economy. Indeed, services represent a burgeoning share of the overall economy (Magnier 
2016). Urban households and workers are necessary to fuel this sort of economic model. 
According to Eswar Prasad: 
 
 “China’s leaders have stressed the importance of urbanization as an engine of growth 
and reform of the hukou system is seen as an important element of that process, which 
should also improve labor mobility more generally (Prasad 2015)”.  
 
	 47	
Urbanization is key to China’s pursuit of a more mature economic system. By liberalizing the 
hukou system, the Chinese central government opens the door for migrants to lay roots in the 
urban areas in which they are needed to meet labor needs, provide essential services, and keep 
the real estate market booming. In fact, “the government wants 60 percent of almost 1.4 billion 
to be urban residents by 2020, up from 56.1 percent in 2015”. Yet government data indicates that 
total migrant workers seeking jobs outside of their province dropped by 1.5% (Goh and Jim 
2016). Though the growing network of migrants can help new workers to find jobs and housing, 
migration remains strenuous. To encourage continued or increased migration, China must make 
it easier for migrants to obtain a hukou in their new city of residence, so that they can access 
local services. Urbanization is essential to China’s continued economic growth and hukou reform 
is essential to urbanization.  
 Though the state’s rationale for hukou reform seems to be focused on political stability 
and economic development, that is not to say that hukou reforms do not have consequences 
beyond the scope of their intended purpose. Whether intended or not, it is possible that hukou 
reforms could reduce the inequality of opportunity (discussed in section III) in education and 
healthcare, as well as closing the chasm between the three classes of citizens. Policies and 
reforms often have collateral consequences that are beyond the scope of their intended effects. 
However, my analysis indicates that is not the case with hukou reform, as I will explain in the 
next section. 
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ii. Impacts	of	Reforms	
Would modifying, or even abolishing, the hukou system truly bring about positive 
changes, such as increasing equality of opportunity? Urban security forces oppose liberalizing 
the hukou system because they worry that an influx of peasant families will produce chaos. There 
is also the question of whether the majority of rural hukou holders even want an urban hukou. 
We should note that some rural residents are hesitant to relinquish their rural hukou because 
agricultural hukou’s come with ownership over a small plot of farmland. Given the past 
difficulty of hongzhuanfei (transferring from rural to urban hukou), land has tended to remain in 
families for many generations. No person can hold multiple permanent hukou’s at a given time, 
meaning that rural hukou holders would have to surrender their rural hukou and land in order to 
obtain an urban hukou. Nevertheless, the 270 million migrants in China today evidence that 
many rural hukou holders do wish to seek opportunities in the city (Song 2013). Thus, allowing 
cities to issue new urban hukou’s is good in that it allows people who wish to move to the city to 
apply under the points-based plans, but does not force those who wish to remain in the land of 
their ancestors to leave. 
Though it gives the appearance of promoting equality, I argue that the eradication of the 
urban and rural hukou distinction in 2014, as recommended by the 1992 State Council Working 
group, is merely an aesthetic change. It may make administrative tasks easier, as cities no longer 
have to waste time and resources determining whether a farmer whose land has been overtaken 
by urban sprawl is now an urban hukou holder or a rural hukou holder. However, hukou’s will 
remain location-based so the city can still determine whether that farmer is residing in the proper 
area to receive urban goods and services. They just no longer have to struggle over what to label 
his hukou. Thus, this hukou reform renders little substantive change. For this reason, I will 
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continue to refer to hukou’s registered in the city as ‘urban’ and hukou’s registered in the country 
as ‘rural’ for the duration of this paper. 
 In my estimation, the most notable hukou reform to date has been the decentralization of 
hukou administration, which has led to the popularization of points-based plans for the issuance 
of new urban hukou’s by cities. Yet even this reform fails to sufficiently address the inequality of 
opportunity brought about by the hukou system for the following reasons.  
 
 The individuals who have been most disadvantaged by the hukou system are rural hukou 
holders who lack access to quality education and healthcare, and have been relegated to a lower 
class of citizenship. As a result of the hukou system, rural hukou holders who desire to change 
their situation are unable to move to cities in pursuit of a better standard of living, which creates 
an inequality of opportunity. Unfortunately, the most disadvantaged people are also the least 
likely to be granted an urban hukou under the new points-based plans, as they likely lack the 
requisite education and wealth to accumulate enough points for admission. Reforms are meant to 
attract the desired individuals to take part in urbanization but are not meant to encourage just 
anyone to lay roots in China’s metropolises. 
Migrant workers without high levels of education and work skills are unlikely to secure 
an urban hukou under most of the new city points program. Should these individuals elect to 
migrate to a city without an urban hukou, they will face the same challenges that migrants have 
endured for years, as described in section III of this paper. Aside from having access to a few 
fewer jobs as a result of increased competition from new urban hukou holders, little will change 
for the hukou-less migrants. However, even this maybe a non-issue. Sometimes employers prefer 
	 50	
to higher hukou-less migrants because employers have more discretion over level of pay and 
work conditions when workers have little bargaining power.  
 A select group of migrant workers with high education and work skills will receive new 
urban hukou’s through the city points-based programs. Individuals in this group are likely 
candidates for the new hukou’s because they are the best equipped to meet the education and 
financial requirements of the points-based plans. Moreover, many of these migrants have been 
living in the cities for years and may have already begun paying the requisite fees. Because these 
migrants have been filling many of the service or industrial jobs in cities for years without an 
urban hukou, the issuance of new urban hukou’s will have a minimal effect on employment 
prospects for low skilled urban workers who would otherwise fill the service and industrial 
positions. However, urbanites may face increased taxes. When the number of urban hukou 
holders in a city rises, the city must either raise taxes or cut the costs of the goods and services 
that it offers, unless the social insurance that new urban hukou recipients must pay offsets this. 
The impact of reforms on rural hukou holders, urban hukou holders, migrants with urban 
hukou’s, and migrants who retain their rural hukou is summarized in the following table.  
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Table IV: Impacts of Reforms by Group 
Group Impact 
Rural hukou holders No substantive change 
Migrants able to obtain urban hukou Able to access urban goods and services 
Migrant unable to obtain urban hukou No substantive change 
Urban hukou holder Fewer low-skill jobs available, may have raised taxes 
or less access to government-provided goods and 
services 
 
 
 Another troubling aspect of reforms, in my view, is that the number of new hukou’s being 
issued is inconsequential in comparison to the existing and aspiring migrants who would hope to 
obtain one. For instance, experts project that Beijing, one of China’s largest cities, will issue no 
more than 10,000 new hukou’s each year (Salvacion 2016), though China now has 
approximately 270 million migrant workers (Song 2013).  
Moreover, a limited number of new urban hukou’s were already being given out each 
year in the past. The main difference, post-reform, is that new urban hukou’s in the past were 
granted by the central government based on a quota system and list of circumstances that 
warranted permission for a rural hukou holder to move into a city (i.e. joining the army, 
becoming a civil servant). Today, new urban hukou’s will be issued by city officials and mostly 
based on points programs. Though the central government has promised to grant 100 million 
new urban hukou’s by 2020, many of these hukou’s are likely to be granted in smaller and less 
desirable cities for migrants. Compared to the number of existing and aspiring migrants, 100 
million new hukou’s is not enough. 
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 This means that a considerable percentage of migrants will continue to be hukou-less. In 
regard to education, my analysis indicates that migrants with children will continue to be forced 
to pay crippling fees to enroll children in urban schools, or else either leave children behind in 
the countryside to be raised by family members and attend lower quality rural schools. 
Moreover, private schools established for the children of migrant workers in the cities are not 
always a reliable option because they continue to face opposition from state and local officials. It 
is not unusual for the government to shut down the private schools altogether or create physical 
barriers to operation (i.e. sending thugs, slashing electric wires (Larson 2014). Additionally, the 
hukou reforms do not appear to lessen the competitiveness for rural students taking the National 
Higher Education Entrance Exam. For this to occur, there would need to be an immense number 
of new urban hukou’s issued in order to make the number of urban students more proportional to 
the number of rural students.   
 Similarly, I argue that hukou reform has had little impact on the inequalities in access to 
healthcare for urban and rural hukou holders. Recipients of new urban hukou’s are the only group 
for which healthcare conditions change markedly. Reforms to the healthcare system itself hold 
more promise for change. For instance, the Healthy China 2020 initiative aims to achieve 
universal healthcare by the year 2020, an important step towards ensuring that both urban and 
rural hukou holders have access to some sort of care (Jarvis 2016). Next, China can reduce 
inequality by closing the gap between the quality of rural and urban healthcare. This can be 
accomplished by increasing government subsidies to rural healthcare providers.  
 The hukou reforms also holds little promise to make the rights and duties of the rural, 
urban and migrant classes of citizens more uniform. Migrant recipients of new urban hukou’s 
will change ranks from the rural class of citizens to the urban class of citizens but limited change 
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will occur in terms of citizenship otherwise. Rural and urban hukou holders will continue to 
assert their rights in such drastically different environments, due to the difference in the rural and 
urban public goods regimes, that the disparate classes of citizenship will not be changed. 
 Nevertheless, the reforms promote the CCP’s interest in separating urban citizens from 
rural citizens, as well as entice the most qualified migrants to remain in the city. Points-based 
programs help identify those migrants who can contribute most to the success of the city. Passing 
off control of issuing new hukou’s to local government also absolves the central state from blame 
if people are unhappy with the system.  
 
VI.	Concluding	Remarks	and	Suggestions	for	Further	Reforms	
	
China’s economic rise has been accompanied by sociopolitical consequences–some 
intended, others unexpected. This paper has sought to unveil a few of these sociopolitical 
conditions through the lens of China’s household registration system, which has been 
substantially loosened in recent years. This system continues to impact economic growth and 
sociopolitical conditions, perhaps more than any other policy in post-socialist China. Maoist 
programs such as the expansion of literacy and enlargement of public health care might have 
been impossible to coordinate successfully at a national level if not for the hukou system. These 
pre-reform initiatives have had a favorable effect on post-socialist China in that they built a 
capable and productive workforce that was essential to fuel China’s rapid industrialization and 
rising capitalist economy. Marketization and social reforms go hand in hand. In the words of 
Amartya Sen: “What we are looking at here is not so much the social consequences of economic 
reforms, but the economic consequences of social reforms” (Sen 259). China’s continued 
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economic prowess hinges on its ability to make sensible reforms to the hukou system in response 
to the nation’s changing economic needs.  
 
Let us now return to the question that I posed at the start of this paper–is the 
institutionalized inequality of opportunity brought about by the hukou system being sufficiently 
remedied by recent reforms? After exploring the key features and historical context of the hukou 
system; identifying the inequality of opportunity brought about by the hukou system in access to 
education and healthcare; considering the disparate urban, migrant and rule classes of 
citizenship; discussing the reforms that have been taking place since the early 2000’s and the 
state motivations behind them; and considering whether or not the reforms thus far ameliorate 
the institutionalized inequality of opportunity brought about by the hukou system; I argue that the 
hukou reforms do not significantly reduce the institutionalized inequality of opportunity brought 
about by the hukou system. They do not go far enough. Not enough new urban hukou’s are being 
issued and decentralizing control of the system only passes off culpability. The reforms are 
effective in promoting the CCP’s hold on power in the single party state, but ineffective in 
reducing inequality of opportunity. Through reforms, the CCP is able to maintain an exclusivity 
in the cities that ensures productivity and that non-contributing individuals are not weighing on 
public goods and services. Reforms also allow the CCP to regain control over a certain group of 
migrants who will be granted urban hukou’s and guard against uprising by either urban or rural 
hukou holders.  
Though my analysis covers only the inequality of opportunity in education and 
healthcare, the inequality discussed in these areas is illustrative of inequality of opportunity 
generally. This is because education and healthcare are some of the most fundamental for 
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promoting opportunity. For instance, if one were to study the inequality of opportunity in labor 
markets, I anticipate that the findings would be strikingly similar to my own. That is to say that I 
suspect that the hukou system limits access to quality labor markets in the city for rural hukou 
holders. 
Though reforms enacted so far fail to address the inequality of opportunity brought about 
by the hukou system, there are changes that the Chinese government could deliver that would be 
helpful to those disadvantaged by the system. Though the “bamboo curtain” has not been torn 
down just yet, there is hope that it can be reformed. One option would be for the central 
government to require the issuance of enough urban hukou’s to at least meet the demonstrated 
demand of the 270 million migrants. Though more rural hukou holders might be enticed to move 
by the new urban hukou’s, it would be sensible to begin by legalizing the existing migrants. New 
urban hukou’s could be issued incrementally and accompanied by increases in taxes or 
government subsidies so that new urban hukou recipients do not overwhelm the social goods and 
services of the cities, as occurred in Shijiazhuang (see discussion section IV). Points plans could 
be maintained initially, in order to admit the most qualified migrants first, but standards for 
admission would eventually have to be lowered. Because so many migrants are already living 
and working in the city, the government should recognize their right to be there. In addition to 
reuniting migrant families, this would allow migrants to participate more fully in their urban 
communities. Granting urban hukou’s to a much larger group of migrants, even if not 270 
million, would promote urbanization, which is a key part of the state’s economic plan. Extending 
urban hukou’s to the numerous migrants would have the added benefit of allowing the state to 
more easily track who is living in the cities, which would assist the state with security and 
control efforts. It would also lessen the number of migrants who might return to the countryside, 
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tell their fellow rural hukou holders how much better off urban hukou holders have it, and 
thereby incite a rebellion that could eradicate CCP control.  
Lowering the barrier to entry for rural families to obtain urban hukou’s is the best way to 
address the inequality of opportunity discussed throughout this paper, as it allows enterprising 
rural hukou holders to pursue a better education, healthcare, and life for themselves and their 
families. However, another option would be for the state to make heavy investment in rural 
goods and services in order to close the gap between urban and rural citizens. Though China has 
already begun investment in the healthcare industry, it needs to focus funds more fully on rural 
health care providers. With a better quality of rural education and healthcare, rural citizens would 
at least be at the same starting line as urban hukou holders.  
These suggestions indicate that hukou reforms to date have failed to address the 
inequality of opportunity brought about by the system thus far, but that all hope is not lost. Short 
of abolishing the system entirely, there are sensible changes that can be made that would benefit 
both the state and the citizens who have been negatively impacted by the hukou system. This is, 
in part, why I have sought to avoid offering a cursory appraisal of the system as good or bad. In 
its current permutation, the hukou system has both good and bad elements. Yet it is always 
changing and it is my hope that this paper illuminates a few areas of the system that are 
problematic, demonstrates why current reforms fall short of addressing these problems, and 
inspires further research and policy proposals regarding possible improvements to the hukou 
system.  
Given that the majority of reforms have only been underway since the turn of the century, 
I suspect that hukou reforms are only just beginning. In this paper, I evaluate the reforms that 
have been initiated prior to 2016, when this project was completed, but further study will be 
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needed as reforms progress and their consequences take shape. It is my hope that the information 
that I bring together on the background, features, and impacts of the hukou system in this paper 
will be helpful to future students of the hukou system, as they seek to make sense of the ever-
evolving system. I feel certain that an understanding of the hukou system will be essential to 
policy discussions regarding China for years to come, given the system’s centrality to the 
nation’s economic growth and the CCP’s control. Perhaps more importantly, no other policy in 
China has so profoundly impacted the everyday lives of the Chinese people.  
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Appendix	
Table V: Provincial Level Reforms 
 
Province/City Date Sources Short Description 
Anhui July 13, 2001 Provincial 
Government 
Notice 
Directs local governments to grant a 
local hukou to individuals with (1) a 
fixed place of residence and (2) a 
stable source of income. Eliminates 
agricultural and nonagricultural 
hukou distinctions. Creates 
exemptions for citizens who meet 
professional, administrative, 
education, or investment 
requirements. 
Beijing April 14, 
1995; June 4, 
1997; March 
29, 2002 
(reportedlyto 
be eliminated 
spring 2005) 
City Regulations 
(1, 2, 3) 
Directs county-level governments to 
grant permanent residence status to 
individuals with either (1) a fixed 
place of residence or (2) a stable 
source of income. Mandates that 
citizens who meet professional, 
education, or investment 
requirements may obtain local 
hukous. 
Requires all migrant workers to 
register with the Labor Bureau. 
Designates the temporary residence 
permit as the sole legal 
authorization for temporary workers 
in Beijing. Mandates that citizens 
who meet professional, education, 
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or investment requirements may 
obtain temporary residence permits. 
Specifies new punitive measures for 
hiring or housing workers lacking a 
temporary residence permit. 
Zhejiang March 29, 
2002 
Provincial 
Government 
Directive 
Directs counties and small cities 
within Zhejiang to grant local 
hukous to individuals with (1) a 
fixed place of residence and (2) a 
stable source of income. Directs 
large and mid-sized cities to lower 
barriers to obtaining local hukous 
for individuals 1) able to purchase 
houses or 2) with advanced 
educational degrees. 
Jiangsu March 28, 
2003 
  
News Report 
Regarding 
Provincial 
Government 
Notice 
Directs county-level governments to 
grant permanent residence status to 
individuals with either (1) a fixed 
place of residence or (2) a stable 
source of income. Mandates that 
citizens who meet professional, 
education, or investment 
requirements may obtain local 
hukous. 
Chongqing July 29, 2003 Municipal 
Government 
Notice 
Directs towns and small cities in the 
greater Chongqing metropolitan 
area to allow rural hukou holders 
with (1) a fixed place of residence 
in small cities and (2) a stable 
source of income to convert their 
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hukous to local ones. Sets 
restrictions on obtaining a local 
hukou via the purchase of 
commercial housing. 
Gansu Sept 30, 2003 Provincial 
Public Security 
Notice 
Directs local governments to grant 
local hukous to individuals with (1) 
a fixed place of residence and (2) a 
stable source of income. Provides 
special hukou exemptions for 
citizens who meet professional, 
education, or investment 
requirements. Eliminates 
agricultural and nonagricultural 
hukou distinctions. 
Hunan Nov 9, 2003 News Report 
Regarding Local 
Regulations 
Directs local governments to grant 
local hukous to individuals with (1) 
a fixed place of residence or (2) a 
stable source of income. Eliminates 
agricultural and nonagricultural 
hukou distinctions. ; 
Hubei August 13, 
2004 
News Report Eliminates agricultural and 
nonagricultural hukou distinctions. 
Shanghai August 30, 
2004 
Municipal 
Government 
Regulation 
Requires temporary residence 
permits of anyone residing in 
Shanghai over 3 days. Requires 
applicants to present evidence of 
stable employment or educational 
qualifications to obtain a temporary 
resident permit. Entitles permit 
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holders to 1) the ability to apply for 
education of one’s children, 2) the 
ability to receive social welfare, 3) 
the ability to be employed by a 
government agency. 
Shandong Oct 11, 2004 News Report Abolishes “migration control 
centers” independently established 
by local city governments to collect 
fees from migrants. Reaffirms 
authority of local Public Security 
Bureaus to handle hukou 
registration 
 
Table VI: Large City Reforms 
 
Province/City Date Sources Short Description 
Chengdu Feb 12, 2004 News Report Outlines the elimination of 
agricultural and nonagricultural 
hukou distinctions by 2007. 
Nanjing June 19, 2004 News 
Report, Municipal 
Regulations 
Mandates that individuals with (1) a 
fixed place of residence in small 
cities and (2) a stable source of 
income may convert their hukous to 
local ones. Eliminates agricultural 
and nonagricultural hukou 
distinctions. 
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Shenyang July 7, 2004 News Story Eliminates temporary residence 
permits and all associated fees. 
Replaces permit system with 
“automatic” registration system 
requiring migrants to register with 
local police by providing 
information on their place of 
residence and work. Guarantees 
rights against physical harassment. 
Guangzhou Sept 21, 2004 News Report on 
Municipal 
Regulations 
Mandates that small cities and 
towns within the greater 
Guangzhou metropolitan area allow 
rural hukou holders with (1) a fixed 
place of residence in small cities 
and (2) a stable source of income to 
convert their hukous to local ones. 
Further mandates that rural 
residents who 1) possess a fixed 
place of residence within 
Guangzhou city proper for a 
minimum of five years, 2) have a 
stable source of income, and 3) 
have participated in the city’s social 
security program may obtain a 
hukou for Guangzhou city proper. 
Eliminates agricultural and 
nonagricultural hukou distinctions. 
Wuhan Sept 2, 2004 News Report on 
Municipal 
Decision 
Eliminates temporary residence 
permit system. Mandates the 
establishment of migrant 
management centers 
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Table VII: Small City/Town Reforms 
 
Province/City Date Sources Short Description 
Jinhua, 
Zhejiang 
August 16, 
2001 
Public Security 
Notice 
Mandates that individuals, with the 
exception of rural laborers, with (1) 
two years of fixed residence in the 
greater Jinhua metropolitan area and 
(2) a stable source of income may 
convert their hukous to local, ones. 
Mandates longer periods of fixed 
residence for rural laborers before 
obtaining local hukous. Mandates that 
holders of a greater Jinhua metropolitan 
hukou with a legal permanent residence 
within the city proper may convert to a 
city proper hukou. Creates exemptions 
for citizens who meet professional, 
administrative, education, or 
investment requirements. 
Hengshui, 
Hebei 
Oct 10, 2003 Local 
Government 
Directive 
Mandates that individuals with (1) two 
years of fixed residence in the town and 
(2) a stable source of income may 
convert to a local hukou. Creates 
exemptions for citizens who meet 
professional or education requirements. 
Eliminates agricultural and 
nonagricultural hukou distinctions. 
Tongzhou, 
Jiangsu 
July 22, 2004 News Report on 
Municipal 
Directs local governments to grant 
local hukou to individuals who possess 
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Government 
Reforms 
(1) a purchased residence, (2) certain 
educational levels, or (3) capital funds 
for investment. Mandates that migrant 
laborers who (1) serve in a municipal 
public institution for five years, (2) pay 
social security taxes, and (3) own a 
legal residence may obtain a local 
hukou. 
Jining, 
Shandong 
Oct 15, 2004 Municipal 
Government 
Notice 
Mandates that individuals with (1) two 
years of fixed residence in the town and 
(2) a stable source of income may 
convert to a local hukou. Eliminates 
agricultural and nonagricultural hukou 
distinctions. 
Ninghua, 
Fujian 
Undated, 
apparently 
current 
Municipal Web 
Site 
Mandates that individuals with (1) two 
years of fixed residence in the town and 
(2) a stable source of income may 
receive a local hukou. Creates 
exemptions for citizens who meet 
professional, administrative, education, 
or investment requirements. 
 
“Recent Chinese Hukou Reforms.” Congressional-Executive Commission on China. 2004. Web.  
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